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  Abstract 
  The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an important 
institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 overhaul of the approach 
and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy towards sports associations and clubs. 
Nowadays, virtually all activities of sports associations that govern and organize a sports discipline with 
business elements are subject to antitrust rules. This includes genuine sporting rules that are essential for a 
league, championship or tournament to come into existence. Of course, „real‟  business or commercial 
activities like ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also have to comply with competition 
rules.  
Regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European competition rules if they pursuit 
a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent to that objective and proportionate to it. This new 
approach offers important orientation for the strategy choice of sports associations, clubs and related 
enterprises. Since this assessment is done following a case-by-case approach, however, neither a blacklist 
of anticompetitive nor a whitelist of procompetitive sporting rules can be derived. Instead, conclusions can 
be drawn only from the existing case decisions – but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open. With 
respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is on centralized marketing 
arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute cartels and are viewed to be anticompetitive in 
nature. However, they may be exempted from the cartel prohibition on efficiency and consumer benefits 
considerations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that centralized marketing arrangements must 
comply with in order to be legal. Although this policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer 
look at the decision practice reveals several open problems. Other areas of the buying and selling behavior 
of sports associations and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed and do not provide much 
orientation for business.  
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The increasing commercialization of sports has turned (at least) professional sports more and 
more into a business. With the increasing weight of economic activities in the context of 
sport,  however,  the  sports  „industry‟  came  under  the  jurisdiction  of  competition  rules. 
Although  many  sports  clubs  and  associations  do  not  view  themselves  to  be  business 
companies,  it  has  long  been  established  in  legal  sciences  that  economic  activities  in  the 
context  of  sport  do  fall  within  the  scope  of  EC  competition  rules  and  law  (European 
Commission  2007b:  63).  This  represents  long-standing  practice  and  is  confirmed  by  the 
European Courts.
1 Similarly, the question whether individual athletes, sports clubs, national 
and international sports association are undertakings or enterprises in the sense of EC law has 
been comprehensively answered in the affirmative as soon as they pursue economic activities 
in the broadest sense and irrespective of any formal status of professional vs. am ateur sports 
(European Commission 2007b: 66-67).  
Competition rules shape the strategic behavior of sports clubs and associations when it comes 
to economic activities (in a broad understanding), defining what types of business behavior is 
allowed and what not. Thus, compliance with competition rules as a considerable part of the 
institutional framework for doing business represents an important element for and constraint 
on strategy development and choice. Therefore, it is relevant for sports business to understand 
the underlying principles and policy practices of European competition authorities, so that 
strategy and management can be shaped in compliance with competition rules. This requires 
specialized research because the sports sector differs significantly from other, more „ordinary‟ 
industries  (Smith  &  Stewart  2010;  Dietl  2010)  –  and  this  is  recognized  by  the  relevant 
competition authorities in Europe. Consequently, the European Commission (EC)  – in its 
Directorate-Generals Competition and Education & Culture – has developed a sector-specific 
interpretation and application of the general competition rules of the European Union. This 
policy also influences the policy of the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) that (i) 
directly  apply  EU  law  to  national  cases  and  (ii)  are  bringing  the  execution  of  national 
competition rules in line with EC policy through the European Competition Network (ECN) 
(Budzinski & Christiansen 2005). 
Unlike the U.S., where antitrust policy in sport business represents a frequently discussed 
issue
2, there is comparatively little literature on competition policy interventions into sports 
markets in Europe. Furthermore, the existing discussion is predominantly driven by legal 
sciences and lacks a sports management perspective. This is particularly true with regard to 
2007-overhaul of the sector-specific attitude to applying competition rules in sports.
3 The 
                                                           
1 Relevant decisions date back to the 1970s and the famous Bosman judgment (1995) also plays an important 
role. See for the most recent confirmation the judgment of the CFI in the Meca-Medina case. Naturally, the same 
applies for other business rules under EC law such as the internal market and free movement rules. 
2 See Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Pelnar 2007; DePasquale 2009; Kahn 2009; Keyte & Eckles 2009; Loptaka 
2009;  Winfree  2009;  Zimbalist  2009;  Feldman  2010;  Grow  2010;  Hovenkamp  2010;  Rascher  2010  for  a 
selection of recent contributions. 
3  See  Robertson 2002;  Papaloukas  2005;  Santa  Maria  2005;  Weatherill  2006, 2007;  Cygan  2007a,  2007b; 
Massey 2007; Szyszczak 2007 for legal analyses, however, predominantly referring to the pre-2007 White Paper 3 
 
paper systematically outlines the underlying principles and practices of EC competition policy 
in  the  sports  sector,  thus,  providing  important  information  and  orientation  for  sports 
management (section 2). It illustrates this by discussing two major cases and its implications 
for sports business and points to open problems and some inconsistencies in the application of 
competition rules to sports (section 3). In doing so, the paper contributes to filling a gap in the 
sports management literature. 
 
2. European Competition Rules for Sports Business 
2.1 European Competition Rules and Case Overview 
European competition policy in the broad sense consists of the competition provisions and 
policies on the community level (European competition policy in the narrow sense) and the 
ones on the level of the Member States (national competition policy). The community level 
provides rules for enterprise cooperation (cartel policy), abusive strategies of enterprises with 
a powerful market position (abuse control), mergers and acquisitions (merger control) and 
public subsidies for enterprises (state aid policy). Without going into detail,
4  
-  cartel  policy  (Art.  101  TFEU
5)  generally  prohibits  any  agreement  between 
independent  enterprises,  especially  the  coordination  of  prices  and  quantities,  the 
division of markets  as well as discriminatory and  boycott arrangements, unless the 
enterprise cooperation cumulatively fulfills five criteria: (i)   increases efficiency of 
production or distribution, (ii) promotes technical or economic progress, (iii)  allows 
consumers a fair share of the benefits, (iv) imposes no unnecessary restrictions on 
competition  (=  the  benefi ts  must  be  cartel -specific)  and  (v)  does  not  eliminate 
competition in a substantial part of the products in question, 
-  abuse control (Art. 102 TFEU
6) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in any 
market, 
-  merger control (Art. 2 (2) ECMR
7) prohibits mergers and acquisitions that lead to a 
significant impediment of effective competition, and 
-  state aid policy (Art. 107 ff. TFEU) generally prohibits distortive aids for enterprises 
by national or regional governments or governmental organizations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
policy. To my best knowledge, the existing economic literature on European antitrust issues (see, inter alia, Ross 
2003; Budzinski & Satzer 2010; Syzmanski 2010 and the literature cited therein; Lyons 2009) does not explicitly 
deal with the post-2007 EC competition policy. 
4 For a contemporary and comprehensive analysis see for instance Bishop & Walker (2010). 
5  Treaty  oft  he  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF;  retrieved  2010 -12-06  at 
16.01); formerly Art. 81 EC. 
6 Formerly Art. 82 EC. 
7  European  Commission  Merger  Regulation  (http://eur -
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF;  retrieved  2010 -12-06  at 
16.17). 4 
 
Out of these policy fields, only merger policy has not yet been a relevant problem in the sport 
sector. Therefore, there is no special Commission policy on sports mergers so far.
8 According 
to the Commission website
9, most cases have been handled under EU antitrust ru les, which 
comprises cartel policy and abuse control. Thus, this article will accordingly focus on these 
policy areas. 
The competition rules in the Member States can differ considerably from the community rules 
and – to put it very simplified
10 – apply to cases that are purely national or regional. If the 
community rules are applicable, however, national decisions must stand in line with European 
competition policy in the narrow sense. National cases do have some importance in the sports 
industry. However, due to the large variety in 27 Member States and due to space restrictions, 
this  article  cannot  include  them  systematically.  Thus,  it  will  concentrate  on  European 
competition policy in the narrow sense. 
The appendix provides an overview over the competition cases handled by the Commission. 
The early cases have often been based on internal market rules with the notable exceptions of 
the landmark Formula One case (see section 3.2) and centralized marketing cases (see section 
3.3). Since the 2007 Meca-Medina ruling, however, virtually all areas of sports business have 
become directly subject to competition rules, including apparently genuine sporting activities 
like  defining,  developing  and  enforcing  the  regulatory  framework  of  a  sports  discipline‟s 
major championships, leagues and tournaments (see sections 2.2 and 3.1). Although the sheer 
case number does not seem to be too overwhelming, the Commission, on its website, cites 
sports business as one among only 13 industries that deserve special antitrust attention.
11 
The antitrust cases within the sports sector can be classified into three categories: 
(I) the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the game), 
(II) business  practices  (buying  and  selling  behavior of  sports  enterprises,  like  ticketing 
arrangements, exclusivity contracts, etc), and 
                                                           
8 The appendix lists the EU case history. Most of the hitherto mergers concerned private equity companies 
acquiring commercial rights holders of sports event. Only one concentration – the CVC-SLEC merger – raised 
anticompetitive concerns as so far it was about to merge the commercial rights of the biggest four-wheel motor 
racing world championship with the biggest two-wheel one. A divestiture commitment to sell the motor cycling 
rights  solved  the  issue  (European  Commission  2006).  Furthermore,  mergers  between  sports  clubs  have  not 
occurred frequently in a professional or business context so far (perhaps with the exception of the Superligaen, 
the Danish premier football league) and mergers between sports associations have merely occurred on a national 
level  without  community  dimension  so  far.  It  is  somewhat  likely,  however,  that  merger  policy  will  gain 
importance in the sports sector with the ongoing commercialization of sports business. 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html; retrieved 2010-12-06 at 16.09). 
10  For a more comprehens ive analysis of the complex competence delineation and allocation rules see for 
instance Budzinski (2006). 
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html. 5 
 
 (III) the sale of broadcasting rights
12 (in particular the practice of bundling and joint-selling 
of the rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a championship). 
 
2.2 Principles of EU Competition Policy towards Sports Business  
The principles of EU competition policy in sports markets have been outlined in the context 
of the 2007 White Paper on Sport (European Commission 2007a) by the accompanying staff 
paper on the background and context of the Commission policy in the sports sector (European 
Commission  2007b).  Although  this  paper  aims  to  provide  guidance  for  sports  business 
(addressing  both  sports  associations  and  sports  clubs)  it  does  not  constitute  official 
competition policy guidelines (European Commission 2007b: 63), i.e. it does not possess a 
binding character for Commission decisions. Thus, it falls short of being a sports-specific 
interpretation of competition law and merely represents a policy notice. However, it can be 
expected that the Commission will actually practice according to the outlined concepts and 
procedures. 
2.2.1. Taking Account of the Special Characteristics of Sport  
The  Commission  acknowledges  that  sports  business  entails  several  special  characteristics 
distinguishing this industry and the related markets from „ordinary business‟ (Lindström-Rossi 
et al. 2005: 74-75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6-7). Explicitly, four specificities of sport are 
enlisted (ibid.). 
Firstly,  the  interdependence  between  competing  adversaries  refers  to  the  basic  sports 
economic insight that the competitors in any league or championship depend on each other in 
order  to  achieve  a  viable  business.  In  stark  contrast  to  „ordinary‟  industries  “where 
competition serves the purpose of eliminating inefficient firms from the market, sport clubs 
and athletes have a direct interest (..) in there being other clubs and athletes” (Kienapfel & 
Stein  2007:  6).  Any  league  or  championship  requires  a  sufficient  number  of  entries 
(competitors) for a sustainable existence. 
Secondly,  the  need  to  preserve  the  uncertainty  of  results  somewhat  mixes  two  different 
principles.  On the one hand, it includes the „integrity of competition‟, a principle that is 
related to the absence of match-fixing, doping, etc. (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 74). On the 
other hand, the „uncertainty of outcome‟ principle (following the similarly named famous 
hypothesis from sports economics; Neale 1964), leads to the “requirement of a certain degree 
of equality or, in other words, competitive balance” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6).
13 In contrast 
                                                           
12 Systematically, the sale of broadcasting rights would belong to the selling behavior of sports enterprises and, 
thus,  to  the  business  practices  category.  However,  due  to  the  outstanding  volumes  and  importance  of  this 
business for some sports, the Commission treats these cases as a separate category. 
13 Already the founding father of sports economics as a discipline,  Rottenberg (1956: 242), claimed that the 
“nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximate equal „size‟ if any are to be successful; 
this seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive sports” as well as “no team can be successful 
unless its competitors also survive and prosper sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of the play 
among teams are not „too great‟”. However, modern sports economic insight takes a more cautious approach: “It 6 
 
to the basic interdependence between competitors, i.e. the existence of a sufficient number of 
competitors, competitive balance refers to a sufficient sporting and economic viability of the 
competitors in order to create a close and sustainable fight for wins and championships. 
Thirdly, the freedom of internal organization of sport associations is highlighted. Sport is 
typically  organized  by  a  „monopolistic  pyramid  structure‟,  i.e.  “a  single  national  sport 
association  per  sport  and  Member  State,  which  operates  under  the  umbrella  of  a  single 
European and a single worldwide federation” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 7). It is not completely 
clear,  however,  whether  –  by  referring  to  the  „often  required  existence  of  one  umbrella 
organization‟ – this specificity represents an analogue to the American notion of the „single-
entity cooperation‟, i.e. cooperative actions that are essential and indispensable for the pure 
(sporting) existence of a league or championship. If it is meant to highlight the essential 
regulatory task of sports associations, setting the rules of a game, then a more specific or 
narrower definition of the monopolistic bottleneck within the organization of sports business 
would be required. While both the concepts of the single-entity cooperation and the regulatory 
minimum tasks drive the conclusion of a monopoly of regulatory power in a given league or 
championship, these concepts do not automatically preclude the necessary absence of rival 
leagues  or  championships  (under the same „umbrella‟ or under different  „umbrellas‟), for 
instance. The FIA case (section 3.2) provides ample indication of the problems of a lack of 
clarity in this issue. 
Fourthly,  preserving  the  educational,  public  health,  social,  cultural  and  recreational 
functions  of  sport,  the  „principle  of  solidarity‟,  represents  a  somewhat  non-economic 
community objective. Furthermore, it remains rather unclear what concrete implications must 
be derived from the inclusion of this principle apart from sports „requiring‟ a certain degree of 
arrangements which provide for  redistribution of financial resources  from professional to 
amateur and youth levels of sport (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 
6-7). 
 
2.2.2. Genuine Sporting Rules, Business Activities and Competitive Effects 
From the special characteristics of sports, namely from the single-entity cooperation concept 
and the essential regulatory task of sports associations, it can be inferred that the activities of 
sports associations can be distinguished in setting and implementing genuine sporting rules 
and conducting business activities. Conceptually, genuine sporting rules would refer to the 
rules  of  the  game,  the  schedule  and  structure  of  the  championship  and  other  activities 
(including the enforcement  of the rules) that are  essential to  generate  a sportingly viable 
league or championship. Examples include the length of the game, the number of players, the 
design  of  the  off-side  rule,  sanctioning  rule  violators,  etc.  in  European  football.  These 
activities can be viewed as being non-business in nature and purely sporting. In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
is simply not the case that competitive balance is either necessary or sufficient to increase the popularity of a 
sport” (Szymanski 2006: 31). 7 
 
activities  like  bundling  and  selling  broadcasting  rights,  market  a  league  or  championship 
product, ticketing arrangements, contracts with equipment suppliers, etc. are not essential for 
a league or championship to come into existence and represent business activities. Following 
this distinction, a manifest policy consequence would be to apply (economic) competition 
rules only to business activities and generally exempt genuine sporting rules. In the times 
before the landmark Meca-Medina ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006, the 
Commission and the European courts appear to have embraced this conceptual differentiation 
(Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005). 
However, there is an obvious problem with the non-business character of genuine sporting 
rules. Sports associations can shape these rules with a view to increase the attractiveness of 
the  sport  in  order  to  maximize  fan  numbers  (and  revenues)  and,  thus,  pursue  a  business 
motivation with the design of the sporting rules, generating economic effects. While in some 
cases it might rather clear that a rule change or the introduction of a new rule serves the 
business interest rather than the sport, it is practically impossible to draw a strict delineation 
between genuine sporting rules and business activities.
14 The ECJ implicitly embraced this 
insight  in Meca-Medina. Two professional long-distance swimmers  challenged the anti-
doping rules of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) under articles 81 and 82 EC (now 
101 and 102 TFEU). By setting too low threshold for the relevant substances and handing out 
excessive penalties for violations, the IOC was alleged to restrict competition and abusing its 
monopoly power. While the ECJ rejected the complaint in question, it took the opportunity of 
this judgement to rule that there is no category of purely sporting rules that are  a priori not 
subject  to  the  application  of  competition  rules.  Instead,  the  court  clarified  that  if  the 
underlying sporting activity constitutes an economic activity (i.e. includes business elements), 
then  the  conditions  for  participation  also  fall  within  the  scope  of  European  competition 
rules.
15 As a consequence, the following  three-step methodology to apply Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU to sports business has been developed   (European  Commission  2007b:  65-69; 
Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 8). 
Step 1: Are Articles 101 and 102 TFEU applicable to the sporting rule? This requires that 
(1a)  the  rule-setting  sports  association  is  either  an  undertaking  or  an  association  of 
undertakings, (1b) the rule in question either restricts competition (Art. 101 (1) TFEU) or 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position (Art. 102 TFEU), and (1c) that trade between the 
Member States is affected. 
Step 1 probably represents the easiest part of the assessment due to the special characteristics 
of sports business (see section 2.2.1). A governing sports association falls under the legal 
undertaking  or  enterprise  concept  (1a)  as  soon  as  the  regulated  sports  discipline  (or  the 
regulated league, championship or tournament) includes business elements (some types of 
                                                           
14 For instance, it is undoubtedly essential to define the length of a match (in football, etc.). However, making the 
match lasting longer or shorter, playing gross or net time or the number, frequency and scheduling of breaks 
might well be decided and shaped according to the attractiveness for television broadcasting and, thus, according 
to business interests. Think about the introduction of extra breaks for commercials, for instance. 
15  On Meca-Medina and its line of reasoning see  Weatherill  (2006, 2007),  European Commission  (2007b), 
Kienapfel & Stein (2007) and Szyszczak (2007). 8 
 
money flows). Apart from very amateur sports, this will be the case for virtually all sports 
events, especially of course for premier-level sports as well as other professional and semi-
professional sports. Virtually all rules defined and enforced by any sports association in its 
essential  function  as  a  regulatory,  governing  body  will  influence  the  comparative 
competitiveness  of  the  participants,  the  conditions  of  participation  or  other  elements  of 
competition and, in this regard, (potentially) „restrict‟ competition in one way or the other 
(1b).  In  this  regard,  sporting  competition  and  economic  competition  are  inextricably 
intertwined  in  sports  business  since  the  essential  regulation  of  sports  events  inevitably 
influences  their  attractiveness  and,  thus,  includes  a  business  dimension.  Due  to  the 
monopolistic pyramid structure of sports associations (see section 2.2.1), a dominant position 
should always be easy to establish.
16 Eventually, the geographic jurisdictional criterion (1c) 
determines the competence allocation between the Commission and the Member States. 
Step 2: Does the sporting rule infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? The sporting rule falls 
outside the prohibition of these provisions if (2a) the rule pursues a legitimate objective, (2b) 
its restrictive effects are inherent in the pursuit of that objective, and (2c) proportionate to it. 
“[A]nticompetitive sporting rules which are inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of 
sport and proportionate do not infringe Articles 81 (1) or 82 EC (...)” (European Commission 
2007b: 63). Legitimate objectives (2a) usually relate to the organisation and proper conduct 
of competitive sport. This may include (European Commission 2007b: 68) ensuring fair sport 
competitions with equal chances for all athletes, ensuring the uncertainty of results by the 
absence of match-fixing, the protection of the athletes‟ health, protecting the safety of the 
spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, ensuring of financial stability of 
sport clubs/teams, the rules of the game (ensuring uniform and consistent exercise of a given 
sport), etc. This list is not meant to be complete. It just provides some typical examples. 
“The restrictions caused by a sporting rule must be inherent in the pursuit of its objective” 
(2b) (European Commission 2007b: 68). It remains rather unclear whether this condition is 
already satisfied if a sporting rule is suited to achieve the legitimate objective or whether it 
must  be  necessary  to  achieve  the  legitimate  objective.  The  second  variant  would  be  the 
stricter one, demanding that without the sporting rule (or its intended change) the legitimate 
objective would be failed. In many cases, in particular when addressing rules changes, the 
„new‟ rule may fail to be necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in the sense that the 
„old‟ rule did so, too. However, the „new‟ rule may improve the spectacle with the same 
degree of objective achievement. Still, this rules change would be considered an infringement 
under the „necessary‟ interpretation of „inherent‟. In contrast, the first interpretation offers 
considerably more leeway for sports associations‟ business strategies since all rules „suited‟ to 
achieve  the  legitimate  objective  do  not  infringe  competition  rules.  From  a  business 
perspective,  the  „suited‟  interpretation  of  „inherent‟  might  be  advantageous  because  it  is 
neutral  to  the  historical  chronology  of  sporting  rules  design  whereas  the  „necessary‟ 
interpretation tends to cement the „original‟ rule. 
                                                           
16  In  the  „ordinary‟  industry,  establishing  the  existence  of  a  dominant  position  is  a  difficult  and  usually 
controversial task. 9 
 
Eventually,  the  „proportionate‟  condition  (2c)  demands  the  competition  restriction  by  the 
sporting rule to be not more restrictive than necessary and applied in a transparent, objective 
and non-discriminatory manner. 
Step 3: Does the rule fulfil the exemption conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU or does an 
objective justification make it compatible with Article 102 TFEU?  
As outlined in section 2.1, an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFEU can be exempted from 
prohibition if five criteria are fulfilled (see there). Likewise, an infringement of Article 102 
TFEU can be compatible with competition if an objective justification exists. So, even if a 
sporting  rule  is  not  inherent  in  the  organisation  or  proper  conduct  of  sport,  it  can  be 
compatible  with  competition  rules  if  a  balancing  of  procompetitive  and  anticompetitive 
effects (according to the respective criteria of Article 101 (3) TFEU) comes to the conclusion 
that the beneficial (procompetitive) effects outweigh the restrictive effects.  
In line with the general trend in European competition policy, the Commission insists on a 
case-by-case  analysis  of  each  sporting  rule  in  question.  According  to  the  Commission 
(European  Commission  2007b:  69),  it  is  neither  possible  to  predetermine  an  exhaustive 
blacklist  of  anticompetitive  sporting  rules,  nor  to  provide  a  whitelist  of  unproblematic 
sporting rules. The only source for this type of knowledge is previously decided cases and, 
naturally, they offer merely an accidental selection of rule types. The case-by-case approach 
offers the advantage of deciding each case on its own merits but the disadvantage of not 
providing much guidance for business behaviour. 
  
2.2.3. Business Practices of Sports Clubs and Associations 
Next to the internal regulation of sport and its intertwined business elements, there is an area 
where sports business conducts more „ordinary‟ business behavior, namely buying and selling 
behavior.  Here,  competition  rules  generally  apply  in  the  „normal‟  way,  i.e.  the  special 
characteristics of sports usually do not play a role. Examples include the equipment buying 
behavior of individual sports clubs or their ticket selling practices as well as the competitive 
behavior of sports-related enterprises like equipment producers.
17  
So far, specific competition concerns have occurred in the context of sports events where the 
federation as the principal organizer has engaged in buying and selling behavior – namely the 
football world cups. More precisely, the ticketing arrangements for these events have been 
scrutinized  and  serve  as  the  only  source  for  principles  in  this  area  so  far  (European 
Commission  2007b:  89-92).  Basically,  two  different  competition  problems  have  been 
identified: (a) discriminatory sales systems (territorial restrictions for the 1998 World Cup) 
and (b) exclusivity contracts (travel agency exclusivity for travel-ticket packages to the 1990 
World Cup; credit card exclusivity for ticket payments in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
and the 2006 World Cup).  
                                                           
17 Note that the sports-media interface is treated as a special issue in section 2.2.4. 10 
 
Two  principles  can  be  inferred  from  these  cases,  namely  (i)  non-discrimination  and  (ii) 
reasonable access to tickets. In particular, the Commission insists that sufficient alternatives 
for access have to accompany any exclusive contract. For instance, credit card exclusivity 
requires  the  existence  of  either  alternative  payment  methods  (e.g.  bank  transfer)  without 
dissuasive or prohibitive costs or alternative sales channels free of the exclusivity to one 
credit card company (e.g. exclusivity only for online sales; card freedom for over-the-counter 
sales). 
Whether these principles will guide possible decisions on other types of exclusivity contracts 
and whether they are appropriate or sufficient in this regard remains open. Especially, the 
increasing role of advertisement exclusivity contracts in the context of Olympic Games and 
World  Cups  (including  the  ever-increasing  scope  of  the  exclusivity)  might  be  viewed  to 
trigger future investigations and cases.  
 
2.2.4. The Special Issue of Broadcasting Rights  
Sport  media  rights  are  viewed  to  be  a  special  issue  by  the  Commission  (European 
Commission 2007b: 78-89; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 10-13) because of two reasons. Firstly, 
due to the extraordinary price increases especially of TV broadcasting rights, they are viewed 
to be one of the main factors driving the economic growth of the sports sector. Secondly, 
sports broadcasting rights are viewed to be an important input to media markets. In particular 
for (pay) television markets, certain broadcasting rights represent a premium content that has 
a  decisive  influence  on  the  competitiveness  of  a  media  company.  Consequently,  the 
concentration of valuable media rights in the hands of very few sports federations limits their 
availability and cause competitive concerns for sports and media markets (Toft 2006: 3).  
A  typical  phenomenon  in  sports  business  is  the  centralized  marketing  of  a  league  or 
championship by the governing or regulatory body, a sports association. Next to creating a 
common  brand,  this  centralized  marketing  strategy  typically  includes  the  bundling  of  the 
broadcasting rights in the hands of the association and the sale of these rights on behalf of the 
original rights holders (the participants, hosts and promoter of the league or championship). 
Centralized  marketing  represents  a  type  of  joint-selling  and  constitutes  a  restriction  of 
competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, namely a cartel (Toft 2006: 4-6; Kienapfel & Stein 
2007:  11).  In  a  league,  for  instance,  it  prevents  the  individual  clubs  from  competing  for 
television  deals,  often  sets  a  uniform  price  (price-fixing),  often  reduces  the  number  of 
available rights in order to increase the price (artificial output reduction), leads to market 
foreclosure in media markets, and can hamper the development of certain sub-markets (e.g. 
new  media  markets  in  order  to  protect  pay-TV  revenues).  Insofar,  considerable  harm  to 
consumer welfare must be expected. 
Next  to  the  considerable  anticompetitive  effects  of  the  centralized  and  bundled  sale  of 
broadcasting rights, the Commission also recognizes procompetitive efficiency effects, which 11 
 
may potentially allow for an exemption according to Article 101 (3) TFEU. More precisely, 
the Commission identifies three types of benefits (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 11-12): 
-  the creation of a single point of sale provides efficiencies by reducing transaction costs 
for clubs and media companies, 
-  the creation of a common brand is efficient as it increases recognition and distribution 
of the product, and 
-  the creation of a league product may increase its attractiveness for the fans (viewers) 
as the product is focused on the competition as a whole rather than the individual clubs 
participating in the competition. 
The Commission has taken a skeptical position as to whether these benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects. Following three case decisions, it has established the practice that it 
views  the  conditions  of  Article  101  (3)  TFEU  (see  section  2.1)  fulfilled  if  a  couple  of 
„remedies‟  are  implemented  in  the  joint-selling  arrangement  (Toft  2006:  7-10;  European 
Commission 2007b: 84-89):  
-  competitive tendering, i.e. a non-discriminatory and transparent competitive bidding 
process  in  order  to  give  all  potential  buyers  an  opportunity  to  compete  for  the 
broadcasting rights, 
-  limitation of the duration of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. employing a „sun-setting 
mechanism‟, according to the current Commission practice in football the duration 
must not exceed three seasons, 
-  limitation of the scope of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. unbundling media rights into 
several separate packages in order to prevent market foreclosure (sometimes combined 
with  „blind-selling‟),  for  instance,  exclusive  football  live  rights  currently  must  be 
separated in at least two balanced and meaningful packages, 
-  exclusion of conditional bidding, 
-  fall-back option, use obligation and parallel exploitation in order to remedy output 
restrictions; i.e. unused rights fall back to the individual clubs for parallel, competitive 
exploitation, 
-  exceptionally: „no single buyer obligation‟ in case of already existing dominance of 
one television operator, and 
-  trustee supervision of the tender procedure. 
Within  the  area  of  broadcasting  rights,  the  competition  policy  of  the  Commission  is 
comparatively  advanced.  The  conditions  for  centralized  marketing  concepts  to  fulfill  the 
exemption  criteria  from  the  cartel  prohibition  are  outlined  in  a  rather  clear-cut  and 12 
 
unambiguous  way,  providing  appropriate  guidance  for  business  strategies  of  sports 
associations. 
 
3. The Practice of European Competition Policy in Sports Markets: Examples and 
Comments 
After having laid out the principles of antitrust interventions into sports business in Europe in 
the preceding sections, the paper now addresses additional implications from some concrete 
case decisions. In doing so, it gets clearer how the principles work. However, the line of 
reasoning also  reveals  some ambiguities in  the  principles and its  application. Section  3.1 
provides examples of sporting rules that have been found to be pro- or anticompetitive in the 
case practice so far. Section 3.2 addresses the FIA case in some detail because it still is the 
landmark case regarding abuse of dominance by a sports association. Eventually, section 3.3 
briefly addresses three critical issues in the competition regulation of centralized marketing 
arrangements. 
 
3.1. Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Sporting Rules: Examples from the Case 
Practice 
Drawing on the existing case practices (see Appendix I), an indicative list of sporting rules 
that are likely to stand in line with competition rules and comply with Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU can be derived (European Commission 2007b: 70-73; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9). This 
list has to be viewed with some caution, however, since the assessment of a specific rule will 
depend on the concrete design and context under a case-by-case approach.  
-  Entry Rules (the Judo case): In order to manage the inherent limits to the number of 
participants  in  a  tournament,  championship  or  league,  the  competent  sports 
associations needs to define selection criteria. As long as they are appropriate to the 
competition  in  question  as  well  as  non-arbitrary  and  non-discriminatory  (e.g. 
following transparent performance criteria), entry-restricting rules are likely to meet 
the criteria legitimate objective, inherence and proportionality (see section 2.2.2). 
-  ‘Home and Away’ Rule (Mouscron case): Leagues are often organized in home- and 
away-matches between clubs and defining a territorial restriction for „home‟ is likely 
to stand in line with the Meca-Medina criteria. 
-  Transfer  Periods  (Lehtonen  case):  Restriction  of  the  time  period  through  which 
players are allowed to  change clubs  (transfer  windows) may follow the legitimate 
objective  to  ensure  the  regularity  of  competitions  (absence  of  „artificial‟  game-to-
game changes in the competitive strength of the teams by hiring and firing players). 
Inherence and proportionality sensitively depend on the concrete design of the transfer 
window. 13 
 
-  Nationality  Clauses  for  National  Teams:  inherent  to  a  meaningful  competition 
between national teams. 
-  Multiple Ownership Rules: Rules preventing that two or more competitors in the same 
league, championship or tournament are owned or managed by the same company or 
person serve the legitimate objective to safeguard the uncertainty of outcome and the 
integrity of competition. 
-  Anti-doping  Rules  (Meca-Medina  case):  Legitimate  objectives  here  may  be  the 
integrity of competition and the protection of the health of the participants. Inherence 
and proportionality may depend on the specific design and context. 
In  addition  to  these  case  related  conclusions  regarding  procompetitive  sporting  rules, 
Kienapfel and Stein (2007: 9) refer to the “elementary rules of a sport (e.g. the rules fixing the 
length of matches or the number of players on the field)”. However, the category „elementary 
rules of the game‟ will be as difficult to unambiguously delineate as the „purely sporting rule‟ 
concept discarded by the ECJ.  
In  contrast,  the  following  rules  and  regulatory  areas  are  viewed  to  be  examples  of  rules 
typically  involving  serious  competition  concerns  (European  Commission  2007b:  73-76; 
Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9-10): 
-  Deterrence  of  Competition  Rules  (the  FIA  case):  Rules  protecting  commercial 
activities by sports associations from competition are typically anticompetitive (see 
also section 3.2). 
-  Exclusive Internal Judiciary Systems (inter alia, FIA and FIFA case). Rules excluding 
legal challenges of decisions by sports associations before ordinary courts typically 
violate European antitrust rules. 
-  Transfer Payment Systems (Bosman case): Payments for transfers of players may only 
be acceptable within narrow boundaries. In particular, mandatory transfer payments 
for out-of-contract players violate European competition and internal market rules. 
-  Nationality Rules (Bosman case): Outside national teams‟ tournaments, restrictions of 
participants on grounds of citizenship raise serious anticompetitive effects (and violate 
internal market rules if EU nationality is involved). 
-  Restrictions of Professions Ancillary to Sport (the Piau case). Restrictions for players‟ 
agents,  for  instance,  must  not  be  arbitrary,  overly  restrictive  or  otherwise 
anticompetitive. In the case in question, inter alia the requirement to deposit a bank 
guarantee  in  order  to  obtain  an  agent‟s  license  from  FIFA  was  assessed  to  be 
anticompetitive. 14 
 
Again, this list has to be dealt with caution since the assessment of a specific rule will depend 
on the concrete design and context under a case-by-case approach. Furthermore, the discussed 
rules represent only a small fraction of relevant rules in sports business. 
 
3.2. Abuse of Regulatory Power: The FIA Case (1999 – 2003) 
Although  the  FIA  case  was  handled  considerably  before  the  2007  revision  of  the 
Commission‟s  competition  policy  towards  sports  business,  it  offers  a  couple  of  useful 
insights.  The  Fédération  Internationale  de  l‟Automobile  (FIA)  is  the  principal  worldwide 
authority for motor racing. Its members are national motor racing associations. Next to being 
a „governing‟ sports associations setting and governing sporting regulations, the FIA also 
engaged in commercial promotion activities. This was viewed to create a conflict of interests 
that sets incentives for the FIA to abuse its regulatory power in order to protect and increase 
the commercial rents from its self-promoted products and, thus, discriminate against and deter 
products under its authority that are promoted by independent agencies. 
The Commission prima facie alleged the FIA to abuse its dominant position in the market for 
global  motor  racing  series  („world  championships‟)  in  four  ways  (European  Commission 
1999; Cygan 2007a: 80-86, 2007b: 1336-1341): 
I.  the FIA used its power to block series which compete with its own events, 
II.  the FIA has used this power to force a competing series out of the market, 
III.  the FIA used its power abusively to acquire all the television rights to international 
motor sports events, and 
IV.  FIA  protect  the  Formula  One  (F1)  Championship  from  competition  by  tying 
everything up that is needed to stage a rival championship. 
Allegations  (I)  and  (IV)  deal  with  the  issue  of  deterring  competitive  threats  to  flagship 
championships of FIA by tying up the essential factors for organizing and promoting a rival 
series. More precisely, it refers to FIA‟s contractual and licensing practices which usually 
included  an  exclusive  commitment  to  the  FIA  series  and  threatened  withdrawal  of  the 
participation right in FIA flagship championships in case of any engagement in rival series. 
For instance, contracts with circuit owners prevented circuits used for F1 Grand Prix races 
from being used for races that could compete with F1. The so-called Concorde Agreement 
(the  basic  contract  constituting  the  F1  world  championship)  prevented  F1  teams  from 
participating in any rival series and contracts with broadcasters included significant fines in 
case they broadcasted anything deemed by FIA‟s commercial rights  management to  be a 
competitive threat. (II) refers to evidence that FIA abused its monopoly position as a regulator 
to force a competing promoter out of the market. The GTR organization had successfully 
promoted a sports car championship (Gran Turismo, GT), which – after driving them out of 
the market by denying access to circuits, drivers, teams, etc. – then was replaced by a similar 15 
 
championship under FIA promotion (FIA GT Championship). Hence, the double role of FIA 
(and its associated companies) as a monopoly regulator and a competitor in the promoter 
market played an important role. Allegation (II) refers to a new FIA rule from 1995 claiming 
the television rights to all motor sports events under its authority. This implied that promoters 
competing with FIA (and its associated companies) were forced to assign the television rights 
to  their  competitor  (which  was  also  the  regulatory  monopolist).  In  economic  terms,  the 
allegations against FIA rested on (i) exclusive contracts including prohibitive sanctions with 
essential factors of production as well as (ii) leveraging the monopoly power from being the 
governing  sports  association  into  the  promoter  market.  Both  anticompetitive  conducts 
constitute  an  abuse  of  dominance  and  a  violation  of  European  antitrust  rules  (in  modern 
connotation Article 102 TFEU).  
Furthermore, the Commission criticized the internal decision making and appeal procedures 
of FIA, in particular with respect to a lack of transparency. The exclusion of ordinary courts 
for appeals against FIA decisions was also downturned. 
Eventually,  and  in  order  to  heal  the  anticompetitive  effects,  the  European  Commission 
(2001b; Cygan 2007a: 86-88, 2007b: 1341-1343) established that FIA must  
I.  establish a complete separation of the commercial and regulatory functions in relation 
to  the  FIA  Formula  One  World  Championship  and  the  FIA  World  Rally 
Championship;  
II.  improve transparency of decision making and appeals procedures and create greater 
accountability; 
III.  guarantee access to motor sport to any person meeting the relevant safety and fairness 
criteria; 
IV.  guarantee access to the international sporting calendar and ensure that no restriction is 
placed on access to external independent appeals; 
V.  modify  the  duration  of  free-to-air  broadcasting  contracts  in  relation  to  the  FIA 
Formula One World Championship with a maximum duration of three years (reduced 
from five years). 
Fundamentally, the Commission‟s remedies focus on two issues: (i) unbundling the tying in 
of all relevant factors necessary to organize a motor racing championship by breaking up the 
exclusivity contracts and by enjoining the related contractual penalties, and (ii) separating the 
regulatory management of the prime world championships from the commercial management 
in order to demotivate any conflict of interest.  
Reducing the scope for discriminating exclusivity contracts represents a somewhat „ordinary‟ 
limitation of the strategic options of enterprises with strong market dominance – like, for 
instance,  in  the  famous  Microsoft  case  –  and  as  such  is  rather  unproblematic.  The  new 
methodology (see section 2.2.2) would not have changed the assessment since this type of 16 
 
long-run discriminating exclusivity contracts with prohibitive contractual penalties can hardly 
be viewed to be inherent to organizing a world championship in four-wheel motor racing. 
Next to violating the inherence principle, the massive restrictions of the strategic business 
freedom of circuit owners, teams, manufacturers and drivers additionally fails to respect the 
proportionality principle. 
The more difficult part of the Commission‟s decision in this respect refers to the underlying 
objective  of  FIA‟s  contractual  policy.  Does  the  prevention  of  a  rival  series  represent  a 
legitimate or an illegitimate objective for a governing sports association? In the FIA case, the 
Commission clearly views the deterrence of a rival series to the FIA Formula One World 
Championship to be anticompetitive (Cygan 2007a, 2007b) and, thus, implicitly to represent 
an illegitimate objective. However, Commission acknowledges that the specificities of sport 
include the acceptance of the „monopolistic pyramid structure‟ of sports organization and the 
need for an umbrella cooperation of all participants in terms of regulation and the creation of 
a single-entity championship, league or tournament (see section 2.2.1). Furthermore, when 
assessing the competitive effects of centralized marketing, the Commission puts weight on the 
efficiency effects from having one single top-tier league, championship or tournament (see 
sections 2.2.4 and 3.3). Nowhere in the football cases, for instance, the Commission asks for 
opening up the structures for a rival championship, neither in terms of regulatory management 
nor  in  terms  of  commercial  management.  Unfortunately,  the  issue  of  the  benefits  and 
deficiencies of rival championships on the premium level of sports has not received much 
attention  in  the  sports  economics  and  management  research  literature.  Four-wheel  motor 
racing offers an illustrative example why such a research would warrant some effort. Probably 
in contrast to established ball sports disciplines, the question of what constitutes a rival series 
is  not  that  obvious  in  motor  racing.  Does  an  open  wheel  single-seater  cars  world 
championship compete with a sports cars world championship? And the latter with a touring 
car world  championship? Does  the American-based but  internationally  expanding  Indycar 
series (another open wheel single-seater format) represent a competitive threat to Formula 
One? What about sprint vs. endurance race formats? Do the feeder categories GP2, GP3, 
Renault World-Series, Formula Two, Formula 3 Euroseries, Auto GP, IndyLights, Formula 
Nippon, etc. compete with each other and belong to the same market?  Interesting market 
definition  issues  surface  that  prevent  a  trivial  answer  to  the  legitimacy  question  of  the 
association‟s objective of preventing a „rival‟ series.
18 
This non-trivial issue leads over to the second prerogative of the Commission‟s intervention 
into  motor  racing,  namely  the  separation  of  regulatory  management  and  commercial 
management.  For  instance,  Cygan  (2007a:  89-92)  remains  skeptical  whether  the 
Commission‟s intervention has brought a substantial change in television rights policy. The 
Commission‟s obligations were implemented by (i) separating FIA (regulatory agency) and 
FOA  (Formula  One  Administration  Ltd.;  commercial  management)  for  the  then-running 
                                                           
18 The comparatively few treatments in sports economics and management highlight the benefits of a league or 
championship monopoly (inter alia, Fort & Quirk 1997; Rascher 2010: 29-34; cf. Ross 1995: 733-753) – but 
without  exploring  the  difficult  market  definition  issue  that  may  emerge  outside  the  usual  football-baseball-
basketball analyses. 17 
 
Concorde Agreement (until 2008). Bernie Ecclestone, effectively controlling FOA (European 
Commission 2001a: 169/5), stepped down as a FIA Vice-President in order to dissolve the 
personal inter-linkage as well.
19 Furthermore, FIA and the Formula One Group (FOG; CEO: 
Bernie Ecclestone
20), draw up a 100 year contract handing the commercial rights for the FIA 
Formula  One  World  Championship  exclusively  to  FOG  from  2010-2110  (European 
Commission 2006: 3). This new construction was accepted by the Commission following a 
monitoring period (European Commission 2003b). According to Cygan (2007a, 2007b), the 
„new‟ commercial rights holder basically continues the previous policies. In particular, the 
low revenue participation of teams and other stakeholders via the Concorde Agreement is 
continuing or has only very modestly improved. Cygan (2007a: 89-93) further conjectures 
that substantially nothing has changed regarding the common interest of regulatory authority 
(FIA) and commercial promoter (FOA/FOG) to prevent the establishment of a rival series to 
F1.  Insofar,  the  separation  of  genuine  sporting  regulation  and  commercial  management 
appears to be void in hindsight. Cygan (2007a: 91, 93) refers to the example of the 2006 
manufacturers breakaway series threat, motivated predominantly by the low revenue shares 
from the commercial revenue of marketing F1. “It is no coincidence that, in March 2006, new 
safety regulations, improved provisions for revenue distribution between the teams and the 
sale of the commercial rights for 2008 onwards were all concluded at a time when FIA was 
seeking to avoid a competitor series being established. These arrangements will compose the 
new Concorde Agreement which the teams have signed in September 2006 to participate in 
Formula One beyond this date” (Cygan 2007a: 93). The breakaway controversy between the 
team organization FOTA (Formula One Teams Association) on the one side and FIA & FOG 
on the other side offers another prime example – and, again, the establishment of a rival series 
was successfully deterred. 
From today‟s perspective, it appears to be somewhat doubtful whether the enforced separation 
of commercial management and governing authority stands in line with the post-2007 sports 
competition policy of the Commission. And even before that the Commission took a different 
stance with respect to European football where it confirmed a neutral position towards the 
organization of commercial management within or outside the regulatory sports associations 
(Toft 2006: 6-7). From a competition economics perspective, a 100 year contract handing the 
commercial rights monopoly to a private profit-oriented company might actually raise more 
competition  concerns  than  a  the  conflict  of  interests  that  the  Commission  (probably 
ineffectively) tried to eliminate. It is certainly difficult to see why FOG should behave under 
more effective competitive pressure than FIA-FOA pre-2001. However, the influence of the 
share- and stakeholders of Formula One on the exploitation and utilization of the commercial 
rights revenues has considerably decreased. 
 
                                                           
19 Bernie Ecclestone, nevertheless, became a member of the all-important FIA World Motor Sport Council as a 
„team representative‟. 
20  http://www.cvc.com/Content/EN/OurCompanies/CompanyDetails.aspx?PCID=737; retrieved 2010 -12-12 at 
15.31. 18 
 
3.3. Centralized Marketing: the European Football Cases 
There have been three cases so far where the Commission has dealt with the centralized 
marketing  of  sports  media  rights  by  football  associations.  The  first  one  was  the  UEFA 
Champions League case in 2003, the second one the English Premier League case (2002 – 
2004) and the third one the Bundesliga case in 2005. While the handling and the decision of 
these  football-related  cases  demonstrate  a  coherent  and  comparably  clear-cut  policy  (see 
section 2.2.4), three interesting issues surface at a closer look: (i) the economic reasoning of 
the efficiency effects, (ii) the comparison to the treatment of centralized marketing in other 
sports  disciplines,  and  (iii)  the  coherence  with  exemplary  decisions  by  Member  State 
authorities. Due to space limitations, these aspects can only be sketched in the context of this 
paper. However, this suffices for demonstrating that the framework for media rights selling 
strategies of sports associations may not be so unambiguous as it appears on first sight (see 
section 2.2.4). 
3.3.1. Economic Reasoning 
The  economic  reasoning  of  the  Commission  regarding  the  efficiencies  justifying  an 
exemption  of  centralized  marketing  arrangements  (following  the  conditions  outlined  in 
section 2.2.4) embraces one interesting line of argument and interestingly dismisses another 
one. The single-point-of-sale argument appears to embrace an unorthodox transaction cost 
concept at first sight. Indeed, having a monopoly supplier reduces transaction costs in the 
sense that costs of searching and selecting disappear. It would be a mistake in economic 
reasoning, however, to confuse „minimum transaction costs‟ with „efficiency‟. Competition 
involves necessary transaction costs since it creates product and service diversity, allocative 
efficiencies  as  well  as  innovation  and  technological  change.  All  these  factors,  however, 
improve consumer welfare despite the generated transaction costs – consumer welfare both in 
terms of lower prices and a consumer-preferences-driven evolution of the product and the 
related services. Thus, arguing that a single point of sale provides efficiencies due to the 
reduction  of  transaction  costs  is  a  nonsense  argument  from  a  competition  economics 
perspective and a dangerous reasoning. 
However, the Commission (European Commission 2007b: 83) argues a bit different. “The 
single point of sale enabled the acquisition of coverage for the whole  UEFA Champions 
League season, allowing programming to be planned in advance. (…) [D]ue to the knock-out 
nature of the UEFA Champions League (…) a broadcaster could not know in advance which 
clubs would make it through to the end.” A decentralized sale of broadcasting rights, thus, 
would imply that the value of individually sold broadcasting rights “would plummet if that 
club  was  eliminated”  (see  additionally  European  Commission  2003a:  rec.  139-153).  This 
reasoning emphasizes the knock-out character (cup system) of the UEFA Champions League 
(European  Commission  2003a:  rec.  145).  And,  indeed,  the  coverage  of  a  whole  cup  is 
impossible to be sold in advance with a decentralized system since nobody knows in advance 19 
 
who  will  survive  the  knock-out  rounds.
21  However,  two  critical  implications  must  be 
remarked. Firstly, this is true only for cup systems – and not for the English Premier League 
or the Bundesliga. Consequently, the efficiency reasoning would have to be different and 
„weaker‟ for pure league systems than for such involving knock-out elements (cup systems, 
play-off elements, etc.). This is not reflected in the Commission‟s decision practice. Secondly, 
it is not clear why the complete coverage must be sold in advance of the season – and cannot 
be  offered  in  sequences  corresponding  to  the  knock-out  rounds.  Selling  all  the  rights  in 
advance of the championship may follow a legitimate objective merely if it is inherent to 
create a common brand (insofar as this represents a legitimate objective). Then, however, the 
creation  of  an  otherwise  not  available  commonly-branded  and  coherent  league  product 
represents the efficiency effect and reference to single-point-of-sale or (strange) transaction-
cost reasoning is not necessary since it does not add consumer welfare beyond the branding 
issue. 
The  economic  reasoning  of  the  Commission  does  not  employ  the  competitive  balance 
improvement reasoning as a justification for exempting centralized marketing arrangements 
under an Article 101 (3) TFEU assessment (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 12).
22 This seems to be 
surprising at first sight since it belongs to t he „textbook wisdoms‟ of sports economics and 
management that striving for more competitive balance represents a legitimate task of any 
sports association (Rottenberg 1956; Fort & Quirk 1995; Groot 2008; Fort 2010: 155-199). 
Moreover, revenue-sharing may be a prime instrument in reducing competitive imbalance and 
centralized  marketing  arrangements  offer  avenues  to  distribute  the  centralized  collected 
television revenues among the league participants in a way to promote competitive balance. In 
order  to  advocate  the  competitive  balance  defense,  it  is  further  necessary  to  point  at  the 
benefits for consumers (fans) due to a more balanced sporting competition. 
The  reluctance  of  the  Commission  to  embrace  the  competitive  balance  defense  as  a 
justification for antitrust exemptions, on the other hand, corresponds to a growing skepticism 
in the sports-economics literature, casting doubt on the interrelation of „more balance‟ and 
„more attractiveness‟ (Peeters 2009; Pawlowski et al. 2010) as well as on the pro-balance 
incentive for league managers (Szymanski 2006) or even dismissing the competitive balance 
justification in total (Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Massey 2007). Still, given the comparatively 
considerable weight that U.S. antitrust authorities are putting behind the competitive balance 
defense, it seems surprising that it did not play a role in the Commission decisions.  
3.3.2. Centralized Marketing in Different Sports Disciplines 
Regarding  the  look  beyond  football,  it  is  interesting,  that  the  Commission  accepted 
centralized  marketing  of  broadcasting  rights  without  considerable  obligations  (like 
competitive tendering, segmentation of rights, trustee supervision, etc.) in Formula One motor 
                                                           
21 In addition, the Commission (2003a, rec. 146) claims that joint selling arrangements are necessary to allow for 
comprehensive highlights programs of match-days. 
22 “The Commission nevertheless considers that it is not necessary for the purpose of this procedure to consider 
the solidarity argument any further.” (European Commission 2003a: rec. 167; see also rec. 164-167). 20 
 
racing. This stands in sharp contrast to the football-related decisions – and although it can be 
reasoned that it simply was an older decision, it remains remarkable that the Commission did 
not take this matter on the agenda again in the light of the football decisions. 
According to Cygan (2007a: 88), the Commission factually acknowledges with its decision 
that motor racing is different from football in the sense that motor sport viewers are interested 
in the chronological development of the championship throughout the season rather than in 
individual  races.  Regarding  football,  he  conjectures  the  opposite,  referring  to  the  typical 
football fans‟ loyalty to one team. Thus, football fans are alleged to be less interested in the 
unfolding of the championship and more in single, isolated games. In other words, while the 
Formula One World Championship is viewed to be one single event (and not consisting of 
individual races as single events), a football league is viewed to consist of individual games as 
single  events.  Such  a  reasoning  might  have  some  appeal  with  a  view  to  the  European 
Champions  League  (albeit  a  bit  stuck  in  the  philosophy  of  the  older  European  cups). 
However, it appears to be rather doubtful that the English Premier League or the German 
Bundesliga are less of an entity than the Formula One World Championship.
23  
Regarding the institutional framework for doing business, sports associations and its members 
should be aware that the clear guiding principles of section 2.2.4 appear to be applicable only 
for ball sports leagues and can not necessarily be transcribed to other sports disc iplines or 
other types of championships and tournaments. 
3.3.3. A Member State Curiosity? 
Eventually, the 2008 Bundesliga centralized marketing „case‟ of the German Federal Cartel 
Office  (FCO)  serves  as  illustrative  example  for  another  tendency  in  marketing-  and 
management-relevant competition policy practices in Europe. It is, however, not a formal 
decision case. Instead, the German football league (DFL; Deutsche Fußball Liga) submitted 
the plans for its centralized marketing concept for the seasons 2009 onwards in advance for 
scrutiny to the FCO. The FCO objected the submitted model and laid out detailed conditions 
for  a  rule-conformal  design  (Bundeskartellamt  2208;  Heitzer  2008).  While  most  of  the 
reasoning does not add to the preceding discussion of the Commission decisions, one aspect 
stands out. The FCO put a lot of emphasis behind the importance of offering comprehensive 
highlights programs of match-days (see also above footnote 20). A prompt comprehensive 
highlights program broadcasted via free TV is viewed to limit the prices that Pay TV can 
charge  the  fans  for  live  broadcasting.  Disestablishing  this  type  of  program  would  harm 
consumer welfare by (i) eliminating the choice between two different product variants (pay 
television  live  broadcasting  vs.  free  television  comprehensive  highlights  program  with  a 
sufficiently small time delay) and (ii) increasing prices for pay television costumers (Heitzer 
2008: 4). The FCO concludes that giving consumers (fans) a fair share of the centralized 
marketing benefit requires the existence of free TV highlights programs broadcasted promptly 
                                                           
23 Note also that historically the Formula One World Championship and its predecessors developed from the idea 
of combining the most important Grand Prix races of a year into a championship classification. In this regard, a 
Grand Prix is much more a single event than one football match. 21 
 
after the matches have been played. This conclusion leads to detailed discussion of how to 
schedule the matches between Friday to Sunday and the possible time slots of the related free 
TV highlights programs for the first and second division of German professional football. 
Inter alia, the FCO demanded (i) the maintenance of a core match-day (on Saturday) and (ii) 
prompt highlights programs in free TV. For instance, the core match-day on Saturdays (at 
least five out of nine matches per match-day; 15.30 – 17.15 o‟clock) must be available for 
such  a  free  TV  comprehensive  highlights  program  before  20.00  o‟clock  because  such  a 
program during prime time (20.00 – 22.00 o‟clock) is deemed to be unprofitable and a late 
night highlights program (after 22.00 o‟clock) is assessed to be consumer-welfare harming 
(Bundeskartellamt 2008: 6-9; Heitzer 2008: 5-6). 
Without going into an analysis of the economic sense of these requirements, the interesting 
thing is the degree of detail of the intervention by the FCO. At the end of the day, the FCO 
and the DFL – in detail – negotiated about the time slots for the matches, the allocation of the 
matches over the weekend and the timing of different types of television coverage. It can 
hardly be the task of a competition authority enforcing competition rules to engage in such a 
detail regulation of management issues. However, this – admittedly extreme – example stands 
in line with the tendency of competition policy in Europe to negotiate „deals‟ with the norm 
addressees and reach consensual solutions (commitments, settlements and remedies). This 
tendency is favored by the case-by-case approach, i.e. departing from a rule-based policy and 
moving towards detail-assessments of each single case. While this may involve disadvantages 
for  the  enforcement  power  of  competition  policy  (Budzinski  2010),  it  offers  sports 




The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an important 
institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 overhaul of 
the approach and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy towards sports 
associations and clubs. Nowadays, virtually all activities of sports associations that govern 
and organize a sports discipline, which also includes business elements, are subject to antitrust 
rules. This includes genuine sporting rules that are essential for a league, championship or 
tournament to come into existence. Of course, „real‟ business or commercial activities like 
ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also have to comply with competition 
rules. 
In summary, regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European competition 
rules if they pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent to that objective 
and proportionate to it (see section 2.2.2). This „new‟ approach offers important orientation 
for  the  strategy  choice  of  sports  associations,  clubs  and  related  enterprises.  Since  this 
assessment  is  done  following  a  case-by-case  approach,  however,  neither  a  blacklist  of 
anticompetitive sporting rules nor a whitelist of procompetitive ones can be derived. Instead, 22 
 
conclusions can be drawn only from the existing case decisions (see section 3.1 and 3.2) – 
but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open for future decisions. 
With respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is on centralized 
marketing arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute cartels and are viewed to be 
anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be exempted from the cartel prohibition on 
efficiency and consumer benefits considerations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that 
centralized marketing arrangements must comply with in order to be legal (see section 2.2.4). 
Although this policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the decision 
practice reveals several open problems (see section 3.3). Other areas of the buying and selling 
behavior of sports associations and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed 
and do not provide much orientation for business (see section 2.2.3). 
Eventually, the increasing importance of competition rules and policy for sports business is 
not yet reflected in the academic literature. In particular, economic analyses of the compliance 
of different types of (more or less genuine) sporting rules with the EC‟s post-2007 assessment 
methodology  as  well  as  economic  analyses  focusing  on  other  („European‟)  sports  than 
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Appendix: List of EU Sports Cases 
Case classification:  
(I) the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the game), 
(II) business practices (buying and selling behavior of sports enterprises, like ticketing arrangements, 
exclusivity contracts, etc),  
 (III) the sale of broadcasting rights (in particular the practice of bundling and joint-selling of the 
rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a championship), and 
(IV) mergers. 
 
Case  Year  Sports  Type  Policy Area / 
Body  Decision 
Walrave  1974  general  I, II   internal 
market rules / 
ECJ 
(i) sports is 
subject to 
community law 




of national teams 




Donà-Mantero  1976  Football  I / exclusivity of 
national players in 
team sports 
internal 
market rules / 
ECJ 
prohibition 
Eurovision  1989 - 
1993 
all  III / internal 
provisions on the 
acquisition, 
exchange and 
contractual access to 
sports programs 
cartel policy; 




World Cup 1990 
Italy 







1994  Tennis  II / export ban on 
tennis balls 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
infringement; 640 
000 ECU fines 
(geographical 
market division) 
Bosman  1995  Football  I / transfer rules and 
payments; limitation 





rules / ECJ 
prohibition of (i) 
transfer fees for 
out-of-contract 
players, (ii) limit 














abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Deliège  1996 - 
2000 





rules / ECJ 
clearance 
(necessary for the 
functioning of the 
underlying 
championship) 
Lehtonen  1996 – 
2000 
Basketball  I / transfer rules, 






rules / ECJ 
allowed subject to 
conditions (only 
if necessary for 





1998  Tennis  II / sponsorship 
agreements between 
sports associations 
and sports goods 
suppliers 
cartel policy, 








Football  II / ticket sales 
arrangements 












rules / ECJ 
clearance 




I, II, III / deterrence, 
rival series and 
abuse control, 
cartel policy / 
clearance with 
commitments; 
                                                           





sports rules and 
business practices 




2000  Football  II / ticketing 
arrangements 














cartel policy / 
Commission 





Football  I / prohibition of 
multiple ownership 
cartel policy / 
Commission 



















I / anti-doping rules  abuse control, 
cartel policy, 
free movement 




2002  Football  I / transfer rules  internal 
market rules; 






Premier League  
2002 - 
2006 












IV / acquisition of 
commercial rights 
holder (initially together 






Games 2004  
2003  Olympic 
Games 
II / credit card 
exclusivity 





SVL / Holmes 
Place 
2003  Fitness  IV / merger between 









/ Commission  broadcasting 











Football  III / marketing 
system 




Cinven / BC 




Fitness  IV / acquisition of 
an international 
fitness studio chain 





Sportfive / HSG 
/ Stadion 
Frankfurt 
2004  Sports 
Facilities 
IV / merger between 
sports marketing 





FIA / Vega 
Tyres 
2004  Motor 
Racing 
I / tyres regulation; 
establishing of a 
single tyre supplier 
for karting series 
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Piau  2005  Football  II / licensing rules 














are allowed)  
World Cup 2006 
Germany  
2005  Football  II / credit card 
exclusivity 




CVC / SLEC   2006  Motor 
Racing 
IV / acquisition of 










2006  Motor 
Racing 
IV / acquisition of 






MOTOE  2008  Motor 
Cycling 
II / business 
activities of non-
profit organizations 
abuse control  





cannot preclude 29 
 
this 
Colony Capital / 
Morgan Stanley 
/ Colfilm 
2008  Football  IV / Colfilm is 






French Tennis   2009  Tennis  I / anti-doping rules  abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Daimler / IPIC / 
Brawn GP 
2009  Motor 
Racing 
IV / engine supplier 

















actual costs of 
training 
 
Sources: own compilation of data from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/case_law.html and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/decisions.html; retrieved 2011-01-24, 10:21. 
 